The Two Main POW Camps
Here is the layout of the infamous Zoo. When you're done, have a look at the Hanoi Hilton, as well.
American nicknames: Zoo, Zoo Annex, Cu Loc, BOQ, Camp Two, Camp America. (Some of these names apply only to specific locations in the camp - see map on right.)
Vietnamese names:
Nga Tu So (the So Intersection),
and Pha Phim (Film Studio).
The dates U.S. POWs were imprisoned:
September 20, 1965 to December 16, 1970
February 8, 1971 to March 19, 1971
June 14, 1971 to July 10, 1971
September 24, 1971 to March 29, 1973
This was the location of the PAVN motion picture institute's film studio before the war. It is located in a residential area in the southwest suburbs of Hanoi, on the east side of Nguyen Trai Street (the road to Ha Dong City), a short distance north of Cau Moi (the "New Bridge"). In 1965, the facility was transferred temporarily to the Enemy Proselytizing Department for use as a POW camp. In April, 1972, Office 22 of the newly formed PAVN Group 875 took responsibility for administration of this and other U.S. POW camps in North Vietnam. After the war this facility was returned to the PAVN motion picture institute.
American nicknames: Hanoi Hilton, Camp One, Camp Unity, Heartbreak, Little Vegas, New Guy Village, West Court. (Some names apply only to specific locations within the prison - see map at right.)
Vietnamese name: Hoa Lo Prison.
The dates U.S. POWs were present:
August 11,1964 to March 28,1973
The French built this prison near the turn of the century, with construction completed in 1901. The name, Hoa Lo, means "portable earthen stove". In the 19th Century, several families lived on the land where the prison was later built. They manufactured earthen-ware hibachis, called "hoa lo". Streets became known by the name of the primary industry or commerce conducted on the street. In this instance, it became known as "Pho Hoa Lo", or "Hibachi Street." After the French built the prison, they renamed the street "rue de la Prison," or in Vietnamese, "Pho Nha Tu". When the French departed in 1954, the Vietnamese authorities changed
the name of the street back to "Pho Hoa Lo" and the name of the prison to "Hoa Lo." Hoa Lo Street is the only street in Hanoi that has only one address on it... the prison. Some of the aging leaders of the Communist government in Hanoi were imprisoned there during the French era.
STATUS OF THE POW/MIA ISSUE: January 2, 2003
1,891 Americans are still missing and unaccounted for from the Vietnam War, though over 450 were at sea/over water losses: Vietnam - 1,444 (North, 509; South, 935); Laos - 382; Cambodia - 57; Peoples Republic of China territorial waters - 8. The League seeks the return of all US prisoners, the fullest possible accounting for those still missing and repatriation of all recoverable remains.
The League's highest priority is resolving the live prisoner question. Official intelligence indicates that Americans known to have been alive in captivity in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were not returned at the end of the war. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that these Americans may still be alive. As a policy, the U.S. Government does not rule out the possibility that Americans could still be held.
Unilateral return of remains by
the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) has been proven an effective means of obtaining accountability, as have joint field operations in recent years, though the first in northern Vietnam occurred in 1985. A comprehensive wartime and post-war process was established by Vietnam to collect and retain information and remains; thus, unilateral efforts by Vietnam to locate and return remains and provide records continue to offer significant potential. Hanoi's decision to establish a Special Research Cell to support their government's unilateral efforts was encouraging, a positive response to the May 1999 League Delegation. Archival research in Vietnam has produced thousands of items, documents and photos, but to date all except 1+% pertain to returned POWs and Americans previously accounted-for.
Joint field operations in Laos are very productive. The Lao
recently agreed to increase the number of US personnel permitted in-country and allow greater flexibility during field operations. Agreements between the U.S. and the Indochina governments now permit Vietnamese witnesses to participate in joint operations in Laos and Cambodia when necessary. POW/MIA research and field activities in Cambodia have received excellent support. Over 80% of US losses in Laos and 90% of those in Cambodia occurred in areas where Vietnamese forces operated during the war, but Vietnam has not yet responded to countless US requests for case-specific records on loss incidents in these countries. Records research and field operations are the most likely means of increasing the accounting for Americans missing in Laos and Cambodia.
U.S. intelligence assessments and other evidence indicate that many Americans can best be accounted for by
unilateral Vietnamese efforts to locate and return remains and provide relevant documents and records. Despite this reality, former President Clinton regularly certified to Congress that Vietnam was "fully cooperating in good faith" to resolve this issue. The League disagrees, but recognizes that legislation requiring the certification includes punitive measures that would reverse political and economic relations to the level in place in 1994. The League supported steps by the US to respond to concrete results, not advancing political and economic concessions in the hope that Hanoi would respond. The Clinton administration lifted the trade embargo, established the US Embassy in Hanoi, normalized diplomatic relations, posted a US Ambassador to Vietnam, signed a bilateral trade agreement and advocated normal trade relations. President George W. Bush also
certified that Vietnam is "fully cooperating in good faith," but added language to outline steps Vietnam should take to improve cooperation, stating: "As we look to further strengthen cooperation, Vietnam's unilateral provision of POW/MIA-related documents and records should be improved, focused initially on archival data pertaining to Americans captured, missing, or killed in areas of Laos and Cambodia under wartime Vietnamese control. Vietnam should also focus greater attention on locating and providing information on discrepancy cases, with priority on those last known alive in captivity or in immediate proximity to capture, and to locating and repatriating the remains of those who died while in Vietnamese control that have not yet been returned. The League is confident that President Bush, Vice President Cheney and senior officials from the Departments of
State and Defense will press Hanoi for answers.
Statistics are provided by the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO)
Live Sightings: As of November 27, 2002, 1,918 first-hand live sighting reports in Indochina have been received since 1975; 1,903 (99.22%) have been resolved. 1,326 (69.13%) were equated to Americans now accounted for (i.e. returned POWs, missionaries or civilians detained for violating Vietnamese codes); 45 (2.35%) correlated to wartime sightings of military personnel or pre-1975 sightings of civilians still unaccounted for; 532 (27.74%) were determined to be fabrications. The remaining 15 (.78%) unresolved first-hand reports are the focus of current analytical and collection efforts: 14 (.73%) concern Americans sighted in a captive environment; 1 (.05%) is a non-captive sighting. The years in which these 15 first hand sightings occurred is listed
below:
Year Pre-76 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-2000 01-05 Total
10 1 0 1 1 0 2 15
Accountability: At the end of the Vietnam War, there were 2,585 unaccounted for American prisoners, missing in action or killed
in action/body not recovered. As of January 2, 2003, 1,891 Americans are still carried by the Department of Defense as missing and unaccounted for, over 90% of them in Vietnam or in areas of Laos and Cambodia where Vietnamese forces operated during the war. A breakdown of the years during which the 694* Americans now accounted for were recovered follows:
1965-1974 War years: (recently identified) 1
1974-1975 Post war years: 28
1976-1978 US/SRV normalization negotiations: 47
1979-1980 US/SRV talks break down: 1
1981-1984 1st Reagan Administration 24
1985-1988 2nd Reagan Administration 156
1989-1992 George H.W. Bush
Administration 116
1993-1996 1st Clinton Administration 232
1997-2001 2nd Clinton Administration 76
2001-2003 George W. Bush Administration 13
According to CILHI, unilateral SRV repatriations of remains with scientific evidence of storage have accounted for only 177 of the 488 from Vietnam; all but 3 of the 178 Americans accounted for in Laos have been the result of joint excavations. The breakdown by country of the 694* Americans accounted for from the Vietnam War:
Vietnam 488*
The tragic issue of America's POWs and MIAs is one that extends throughout time, and across a variety of sub-issues. Although the Prisoners and Missing themselves, the singularly most important aspect should never be forgotten, we have to look at the manner in which the issue as a whole has transpired. At what points did the issue become one that polarized a nation and not just families. At what point did it become a 'popular' cause for the government and the media, as it either distracted Americans from the real issues of the war or actually sold a few extra papers.
We can trace the genesis of the Southeast Asian POW-MIA issue reaching prominence in societies consciousness about 1965. The year 1965 holds significance not because it was the year after a massive build-up based on the Gulf Of Tonkin incident. Not because the numbers of in-country troops jumped from 53,500 in the fall of 1965 to 267,000 in 1966. And certainly not because of the beleaguered view of the war as 'unwinnable', as that view came into being after the Tet Offensive that was yet another 2 to 3 years away.
1965 is a key period, because it was at this point that the North Vietnamese Communists, who had taken US POWs and held them primarily in solitary and without much public fanfare, began to utilize POWs as political propaganda. With the infusion of new and more troops, the numbers of POWs rose dramatically. And with that rise, the increasing need for the DRV and it's puppet militia the PRG and guerilla forces to get the utmost mileage out of every shoot-down and capture. Foreign broadcast journalists, who showed a close political kindredness to the DRV's mission to unify the two Vietnams, were allowed to follow closely as Americans were captured, beaten, verbally abused and assaulted, and the filmed footage of such actions recorded for posterity. The East German, French, Russian and Japanese photos and documentaries show dazed Americans being dragged along or hauled on oxcarts to the rhythm of jeering locals.
The infamous Midnight Marches through the hostile streets of Hanoi and mock news conferences began, providing the DRV with incalculable political gain amongst its captive and terrified citizens. The North Vietnamese had finally learned to micro-manage POWs to provide the optimum results: Create trauma, division and preoccupation among the American public.
Since the genesis of the Second Indochina War, the DRV had steadfastly refused to provide officials of either the USG or any third party access to US POWs. There was no identification, nor were visits or inspections permitted by 'neutral' parties such as the ICRC to insure humane treatment of Prisoners. Once again, the 'accredited' journalists, those who were deemed acceptable by the DRV, came into play.
Through these channels, the few identifications of men known to be captive came to the public's attention. Although the USG had employed substantial intelligence assets to locate and identify Prisoners, this was for the most part, classified information. Countless family members were simply told, Sorry, he's missing. If we hear anything we'll let you know. But through the efforts of foreign journalists, the DRV had a global arena to play out its twisted version of the war and the war criminals that were now in it's possession. They were paraded and parroted against a backdrop of the poor, victimized Vietnamese as agrarian creatures literally being blown away in their rice-fields by these brutal, aggressive pilot-bandits.
With world opinion slowly being shaped, especially after the French rout at Diem Bien Phu and the Kennedy assassination, the USG needed a means by which to convey the hateful nature of the DRV. And it found one in it's treatment of US POWs.
Beginning with the family members, who had been ignored from the very onset, the United States began a program to exploit the Prisoners and family members to the political benefit of the US that would continue until the war's end. The US began a public campaign, part of which was the mass mobilization of the public in a letter writing campaign. Hundreds of thousands of letters were written and sent to the Pacific Rim. But what the citizens of the US did not know, and the families did, was that until that point, POWs were not permitted to send or receive mail. Previous to being a 'needed diversion', the USG had not made known the fact that US POWs were denied all basic human and civil rights. But now, with the tenure of world and national opinion growing skeptical, the USG hauled it out of the mothballs and allowed nature to take it's course.
One by one, as letters were sent, they were refused. Families, sending letters to communist leaders, and leaders of third party nations, found their mail simply marked return to sender. But with the pressure now on, and on a national level, the DRV seeing their political plus turning into an albatross, relented and slowly, piecemeal, letters started getting through to some of the Prisoners.
Tragically, since the DRV was denying its role in the war raging near Saigon, Prisoners captured in the South, were not included in this new view toward Prisoners. The DRV' new attitude was found to exist almost exclusively in and around Hanoi.
In an effort to get help in convincing the North Vietnamese to change some of their policies toward US POWs, the US contacted not only friendly, but adversarial governments as well. It was during this period, that the US unbelievably found a sympathetic ear in the Russian government.
It was the USSR who agreed to help establish a mail route THROUGH ITS OWN COUNTRY DIRECTLY TO NORTH VIETNAM. The USSR also was so gracious to establish a coordinating committee to SORT OUT AND CENSOR PRISONER MAIL. In retrospect, with the involvement of the USSR and it's interference with US POWs from ALL WARS, it appears that as desperately as we may have wanted to be in contact with 'our guys', every scrap of mail that passed through the benevolent USSR provided them with a bounty of information and background on our men. Perhaps some of the very men that the USSR would ultimately gain access to when they were sent from imprisonment in Vietnam to imprisonment in the USSR and other Soviet satellites.
In addition to the bizarre Russian angle, hand-couriered letters, used during the Korean War, was once again employed during Vietnam. Letters hand carried by avowed communists or by anti-war personalities such as Tom Hayden, Jane Fonda or Cora Weiss were hand-delivered to families. Once again, it is chilling to think that people who would say and do anything to belittle American troop morale and that of the POWs were holding in their hot-little hands the precious communications of captive Americans and their loved ones. How tragic that our most problematic adversaries were given such free reign, and to what level were these personal, priceless thoughts exploited by factions such as the Soviet Union, the Communists or individuals on a personal crusade of hatred such as Hayden and Fonda?
The earliest date that mail appears to have made it to the US from the Vietnamese camps is 1968. Many factors influenced the flow: the war in the South; Bombings in the North and the level of anti-war sentiment back in the States. The surviving mail that passed from Prisoner to families and back again shows some interesting aspects. The DRV did not utilize any cancellation marks other than the general Hanoi Post Office. Where mail was traceable during previous wars, the Hanoi regime sought to insure that no records or trails were in evidence. The original envelope was used as an index card, where the censor would keep a complete history of the letter. Date of receipt, contents, who authored it, and if and when the Prisoner was permitted to see it. The ultimate decision on all Prisoner mail was left to a still unidentified individual the ' Comrade in Department 142'.
Prisoners were forced to buy their own stamps, many of which featured American POWs in striped pajamas on them, and the guards would affix the stamps to the envelope. This was done specifically to prevent Prisoners from adding any information on their mistreatment as POWs to the area that would be under the stamp. For the most part, although Prisoners may have been given an occasional opportunity to write, their letters never got through. It was established later on that only men who had been confirmed as POWs by propaganda broadcasts or had been published in captivity were really afforded an opportunity not only to write, but to possibly have their letters sent on to their families.
Men who were still unconfirmed as POWs or were simply listed as MIA, really had a minimal chance of sending out any correspondence. If anyone doubts this, the case of Donald Sparks should reaffirm that conclusion. Carried officially as MIA in SVN by the USG for years, it was only after two letters were taken from the body of a dead VC, and found to be authored by Sparks that he was listed as POW. Donald Sparks himself stated that he never saw another American and was held alone during his entire captivity. How many hundreds of other Donald Sparks were there?
The list of confirmed Prisons maintained by the US for mail purposes is interesting. Especially since the USG has stated they never had a name for many of these prisons with the exception of Hoa Lo. Well, here's the USG Postal Listing with names, route.... and they even have a camp listed in Laos.
Ban Nakay Cave Complex (Via SAM NEUA), Laos
Hoa Lo (Hanoi Hilton), North Vietnam (central Hanoi)
Citadel (Plantation), North Vietnam (central Hanoi)
Cu Loc (Zoo), North Vietnam (5 miles S/W Hanoi)
Thermal Power Plant, North Vietnam (central Hanoi)
Ministry of National Defense, North Vietnam (central Hanoi complex)
Dan Joi (Camp Faith), North Vietnam (10 miles W of Hanoi)
Son Tay, North Vietnam ( 25 miles E of Hanoi)
Noi Coc (Rockpile), North Vietnam (35 miles S of Hanoi)
Loung Land (Dogpatch), North Vietnam ((110 miles N/E of Hanoi)
Vinh Ninh (Red River), North Vietnam (40 miles N-N/W of Hanoi)
Xom Ap Lo (Briarpatch), North Vietnam (35 miles W of Hanoi)