In July 1965 the staff of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), teas drafting the campaign plan for 1966, the purpose of which was to help the government of South Vietnam establish control over the people. The staff concluded that it was possible to secure government control over the I, II, and III Corps Tactical Zones, a conclusion largely based on the presence of American and other Free World Military Assistance Forces in these corps areas. In the IV Corps Tactical Zone, however, where there were no U.S. ground forces to bolster the efforts of the Vietnam armed forces, the staff questioned whether the objective of the campaign plan could be attained. The armed forces of Vietnam were considered capable of maintaining their position in the IV Corps, but not of reducing Communist control over significant portions of
the population and terrain in the Mekong Delta. While additional American and other Free World Military Assistance Forces were planned for the other corps areas, none were planned for the IV Corps area. In the opinion of the staff, there could be no substantial progress in the IV Corps Tactical Zone unless U.S. ground forces were introduced.
As a preliminary step in studying the possibility of sending U.S. forces into the delta, Brigadier General William E. DePuy, J-3 (assistant chief of staff for military operations) of the MACV staff, directed his planners to survey the delta for land suitable for basing ground troops. A team dispatched to examine My Tho, Vinh Long, Sa Dec, and Can Tho concluded that all land suitable for large tactical units was either heavily populated or occupied by Republic of Vietnam armed forces. If U.S. units were based in the delta, they would have to share already crowded areas or displace a portion of the population. Since neither of these courses was acceptable, the planning staff then searched for other means of basing troops. Obtaining river sand as fill material and building up an area to accommodate a division base was considered. U.S. Military
Assistance Command engineers estimated that with the dredge equipment at hand seventeen and a half dredge-years would be necessary to fill an area large enough to base a division. Since adequate dredge equipment was not available in Southeast Asia, immediate steps were taken to procure additional dredges from the United States, but these were not expected to arrive until late 1966. Although not entirely satisfied with this solution, the planning staff believed the building of a base area by dredging operations to be a sound choice.
In addition to a land base, other means of operating in the delta were needed, and the planning staff turned to the experience of the French in Indochina for answers. The French had used small landing craft extensively to exploit the net of waterways from land bases. The American staff planned to use not only small craft but also a group of larger landing craft that would house and support a riverine force. These ships, the planners believed, might also be able to move along the coastline and major rivers and serve as mobile bases. It was known that during World War II the Navy had converted LST's (landing ships, tank) into barracks ships, and the planners believed that such ships could provide a base for a brigade force afloat. As the concept of an American river flotilla took form, the planners concluded that the LST barracks ships could be
altered to furnish a helicopter flight deck and that barges could be provided on which helicopters would be able to land for maintenance. The ships could also be equipped with weapons for defense.
In their initial survey to find anchorage sites in the delta, the planners of the Military Assistance Command suggested seven that might serve. An LST could resupply the river force by traveling from Vung Tau across a stretch of the South China Sea into the selected anchorage sites on the Mekong and Bassac Rivers.
Captain David F. Welch of the U.S. Navy, who headed the Plans and Requirements Division of J-3, the Operations Directorate, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, believed that the afloat force concept merited full study and suggested that a task force be set up under a U.S. Navy commander. He discussed the matter with Rear Admiral Norvell G. Ward, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, who agreed that the idea had possibilities and that some naval ships could be made available.
In early December of 1965, during the monthly Commander's Meeting of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, General DePuy briefed General William C. Westmoreland and his commanders on the concept of a Mekong Delta riverine force that would employ an Army brigade with a comparable Navy organization, and that would operate from various anchorages within the delta. The plan called for the development of two land bases, one for an infantry division headquarters and one brigade, and another for one brigade to be located in the northern part of the delta, probably in Long An Province. A third brigade would be based on the water. With the use of a mobile floating base, the mingling of U.S. troops with the Vietnamese population could be reduced-a prime consideration in view of the reluctance of the Vietnamese to accept U.S. ground forces within the
delta. General Westmoreland declared the idea of a floating base "most imaginative," and directed that a team be sent to brief Headquarters, Pacific Command, and solicit its support.
When General Westmoreland had accepted the idea, reconnaissance was conducted to find a land base for a division headquarters and one brigade. General DePuy and Colonel Sidney B. Berry, Jr., Senior Advisor, 7th Division, Army of Vietnam, selected a base site approximately eight kilometers west of the town of My Tho, where the Kinh Xang Canal enters the My Tho branch of the Mekong River. According to French hydrographic maps, adequate sand deposits for fill material existed nearby. A request was then sent to the joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington for an
additional infantry division to employ in the IV Corps area. For planning purposes the unit was designated Z Division.
During the latter part of December a MACV team headed by General DePuy met with the Pacific Command staff and outlined a general plan for the riverine force. After a period of discussion, the Pacific Command staff accepted the feasibility of the proposal. I In the discussion the concept that the river force operating within the Mekong Delta would be a joint Army-Navy task force was emphasized. It was felt that barracks ships, then in storage, could be utilized to house part of the force, and that these barracks ships could. be supported by small landing craft, patrol boats, and helicopters. Such support would enable the river force to conduct operations within a defined radius of the floating base. In addition, the mobility of the small craft would help to protect the floating base.
Upon acceptance by the Commander in Chief, Pacific, of the feasibility of a riverine force, the joint Chiefs of Staff tentatively approved the employment of an Army division in the Mekong Delta to put the plan in operation. The force was to be provided barracks ships and LCM-8's. The matter of land bases was left unanswered in the joint staff action of the Commander in Chief, Pacific.
In Washington the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Horacio Rivero, Jr., supported the concept of a riverine force and approved a proposal to send a planning group to Saigon to work with the MACV staff. The group was asked to develop a complete plan and to specify the means to support it. Headed by Captain David Bill, U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and consisting of representatives of the Bureau of Ships, the Marine Corps, and the Amphibious Command, Pacific, the planning group arrived in Vietnam in January of 1966. Together the MACV staff and the Navy group studied in detail the experience of the French and Vietnamese with river assault forces in order to establish a similar American force, but one with greater capabilities. Under the leadership of Captain Welsh and Captain Bill, requirements were drawn up for
self-propelled barracks ships (APB's), LST's, large covered lighters (YFNB's), large harbor tugs (YTB's), landing craft repair ships (ARL's), and a mine countermeasures support ship (MCS) ; all were to carry appropriate armament for the area of operations. The LCM-6 would be used instead of the LCM-8, which was in limited supply.
In a message of 19 February, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, requested that the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, develop and submit a detailed plan of operations and logistical support for the employment of a Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force. The plan was to cover force composition and phasing, tasks to be executed, methods of execution, navigable areas, operating areas, afloat force locations, afloat force base, provisions for U.S. Air Force, Navy gunfire, and helicopter support, and command relationships. The Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, Jr., also asked for amplification of the logistics involved: depots and ports from which support would be provided, additional facilities required at the logistic support base, requirements for additional lighterage,
and specification of other resources needed to support operations. Representatives of Admiral Sharp would meet with the MACV staff to "assist in the development of the foregoing and to facilitate subsequent evaluation and review." The MACV-Navy group continued to plan, following the guidance of the Commander in Chief, Pacific.
The planning culminated in a MACV study, Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force Concept and Requirements, dated 7 March 1966, which was forwarded on 15 March 1966 to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, for approval. The study articulated fully for the
first time the concept for the Army-Navy force afloat. It later proved to be a far-sighted and comprehensive blueprint for the preparation of both Army and Navy components and the conduct of operations. Most of the planned features of the force as stated in this document later materialized in the operational force.
The study recommended that the force contain a U.S. Army reinforced brigade consisting of three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and other combat and combat service support. The force would be based aboard U.S. Navy ships that would include 5 self-propelled barracks ships, 2 LST's, 2 large harbor tugs, and 2 landing craft repair ships. In addition, two U.S. Navy river assault groups would provide tactical water mobility. Each assault group would be capable of lifting the combat elements of one reinforced infantry battalion. A small salvage craft would be necessary to recover damaged ships or craft. The reinforced brigade would be organized under the current standard ROAD (Reorganization Objective Army Divisions) tables of organization and equipment, with limited augmentation. Certain equipment specified in the tables, such as
tents, mess facilities, 106-mm. recoilless rifles, antitank wire-guided missiles, and all wheeled vehicles except artillery prime movers were to be deleted from the force requirements. The number of 90-mm. recoilless rifles in each rifle company was to be reduced from six to three to improve the mobility of the weapons squads. The 4.2-inch mortars would accompany the force and be moved by water or air to field positions as necessary. Radios would be either ship-mounted or man-portable. Coxswains of plastic assault boats were to he designated in the proposed tables and trained upon arrival in Vietnam. Enough troops from each of the units afloat would be left at a land base to maintain equipment left in storage. The plan provided for an augmentation of three counter-mortar radar sections, each manned by nine men, to operate and maintain ship-mounted counter-mortar radars. A mobile
Army surgical hospital team, U.S. Air Force tactical air control parties which included forward air controllers, Vietnam Army liaison troops, and additional ANPRC-25 radios were to be furnished from sources outside the parent division of the brigade.
Each river assault group, later designated river assault squadron, was to consist of the following: 52 LCM-6's to serve as armored troop carriers, 5 LCM-6's to serve as command and communication boats, 10 LCM-6's to serve as monitors, 32 assault support patrol boats, and 2 LCM-6's to serve as refuelers. A salvage force would include: 2 2,000-ton heavy lift craft, 2 YTB's for salvage, 2 LCU's
(
landing craft, utility), and 3 100-ton floating dry docks. The Mobile Afloat Force concept stated the specific tasks the force was to accomplish: secure U.S. base areas and lines of communication required for U.S. operations; conduct offensive operations against Viet Cong forces and base areas that posed a threat both to the national and to the IV Corps Tactical Zone priority areas for rural construction in co-ordination with Republic of Vietnam armed forces and other U.S. forces; isolate the most heavily populated and key food-producing areas from Viet Cong base areas; interdict Viet Cong supply routes; and in co-ordination with the Vietnam armed forces provide reserve and reaction forces in the IV Corps Tactical Zone.
Because the Viet Cong forces were dispersed throughout the Mekong Delta, the river force would be required to operate in many locations. Initial operations would be conducted in the provinces to the north of the Mekong River-Go Cong, Dinh Tuong, Kien Phong, Kien Tuong, and as far north as the Plain of Reeds. Once the Viet Cong main force units were neutralized in these areas, with the U.S. Navy GAME WARDEN forces con
trolling Viet Cong cross-river movements, the center of gravity of U.S. operations would shift south into the provinces between the Mekong and the Bassac and eventually south of the Bassac River.
It was decided to use a brigade for initial operations because the experience of U.S. forces in Vietnam indicated that the brigade was the smallest U.S. unit that could be safely and economically kept in the delta. It was large enough to defend its base against heavy enemy attack and at the same time to have forces available for offensive operations.
The formal plan of the Military Assistance Command required the construction of a land base by dredging. Since land reclamation would be expensive and time-consuming, however, the plan also recommended the creation of a water base as well in order to use American forces most effectively. The plan indicated that the land base near My Tho could be made available at the end of 1966 or in early 1967.
Criteria for the selection of anchorages for the floating base were established. The base was to be reasonably near an airfield; be within or contiguous to a relatively secure area; have access to a land line of communications; have enough room to anchor the entire force; and have a river bank that would permit debarking of artillery to provide fire support to the force. Sites that met most of the above criteria were found in the vicinity of My Tho, Vinh Long, Cao Lanh, Tra Vinh, Can Tho, Long Xuyen, and Dai Ngai, which was in the vicinity of Soc Trang.
Recognizing that the My Tho land base would not be large enough to accommodate a division headquarters until early in 1968, the plan called for the Z Division to go initially to Ba Ria, which lies north of Vung Tau. The division base was to include a division headquarters, a support command, one brigade, and a storage area for the heavy equipment and rolling stock of the two brigades sent into the delta-one to be land-based near My Tho rather than in Long An Province, and a second to be the Army component of the Mobile Afloat Force. Vung Tau was to be the port for staging and resupplying the Mobile Afloat Force. Minimum security measures would be needed for the force when it was at Vung Tau and when it was traveling from there to the Mekong River. During navigation of the major rivers, however, continuous security measures would be
necessary. Such movements were to be considered ventures through hostile territory and were to be handled much the same way as running a tactical land convoy.
The plan provided for continuous air cover, both by fixed-wing tactical aircraft and armed helicopters. Advance, flank, and rear security on the rivers was to be provided by U.S. Navy river assault groups. GAME WARDEN forces would provide intelligence to assist in reconnoitering the route. The mine countermeasures were to be chain drags pulled along either side of the channel to cut command detonation wires of river mines, and mine-hunting sonar. Canals terminating in the main river might harbor hostile boats and were therefore to be reconnoitered by both boat and air. Armed helicopters, in conjunction with the Navy assault groups, were to cover the banks of the rivers and search out possible ambush sites. The major ships were to be at a condition of highest watertight integrity during transit, and fixed weapons were to be manned to
counter enemy attack. Major ships of the force were to be moved in daylight hours.
At the anchorage of the afloat base, an area security plan would be in effect, with Army security forces on shore and reinforced by artillery. Outposts including foot and boat patrols would be used. The barracks ships would be moored near the center of the river and their countermortar radars could provide coverage of the surrounding area. All weapons would be manned, with an Army-Navy reaction force standing by while the ships were at anchor.
The plan recognized three principal enemy threats. The first was infiltration by small mortar or recoilless rifle teams which would attempt to penetrate the infantry perimeter ashore. These teams would probably fire several rounds quickly and then withdraw rapidly. The second threat was that of a large-scale, overt attack. The third and possibly the most critical threat to the floating base would come from the water-floating mines, swimmer saboteurs, and suicide boats. Measures to counter the threats were left to the commanders immediately concerned.
The Mobile Afloat Force concept provided for a variety of tactical operations. The force would remain in an enemy base area as long as operations could be profitably conducted-about four to six weeks. Ground operations would last four to five days, after which troops would be allowed a rest of two or three days to dry out and to repair equipment. It was believed that the force could conduct four operations a month. A brigade would be deployed in the delta for as long as six months, with the possibility of rotation with either the brigade at My Tho or that at Ba Ria. The force would obtain intelligence and develop plans prior to its arrival in a base area, and operations would commence as soon as the floating base arrived at its anchorage. The brigade would rely heavily on local Vietnamese intelligence organizations.
To acquire knowledge of the area in which the force was operating, elements of the brigade, embarked in Navy assault group boats, helicopters, and plastic assault boats, would be employed to gather data on stream and canal depths, height of banks, areas for beaching, possible artillery positions, helicopter landing zones, the local population, and the enemy.
Full-scale operations would be conducted by deploying the force into the combat area by water, land, and air. Security for the floating base would require from a company to as much as a battalion in the immediate base area. Operations could range up to fifty kilometers from the floating base and, in exceptional cases, beyond. Security measures similar to those for relocation of the major ships would be taken for the movement of the assault craft formations during operations. Tactical air and armed helicopters were to fly cover, and artillery would displace by echelon as required to provide continuous fire support. The assault support patrol boats were to furnish forward, flank, and rear security, and to sweep for shore-
Covering fully one third of South Vietnam, the Mekong Delta, is an extensive area of low-lying marsh and swamp land, crisscrossed by myriad rivers, tributaries and canals. Due to constant flooding, the Riverine unit structures primary mode of transport and communication between the isolated hamlets and the larger population centers was by water. The Delta formed the IV Corps Tactical Zone.
The Viet Cong used the waterways of the Delta extensively for the movement of troops and materials and as a primary communications route. They were, as a result of the population density of the Delta, also politically very active. It became clear quite early in the conflict (as it had done for the French in their war with the Viet Minh) that control of the waterways of the Delta was of major importance strategically.
In September of 1966 the US Navy established it’s River Patrol Force, codenamed ‘Game Warden’, and designated it Task Force 116 which became operational on 11th February 1966.
Uniflite 31' Sport Sedan
This is the civilian boat that was converted to the Patrol Boat River (PBR) MK I that was used in Vietnam so successfully by the Brown Water Navy's operation code named GAME WARDEN (T.F. 116).
Task Force 116’s mission was to police the waterways by conducting river patrols and inshore surveillance in order to enforce the curfew, interdict and disrupt Viet Cong infiltration and to maintain Government control over the region..
PBR MKII
The original organization of TF 116 consisted of 120 boats which were organized into 4 Divisions, each of 3 Sections. Each Section consisted of 10 boats. The boat used was the PBR Mk I (Patrol Boat River).
Patrols generally consisted of 2 boats operating within radar range of each other and working a patrol zone some 50km in length. The boats would move in loose column and at varying speeds. Their routes and timing were randomly determined. The patrol would interdict traffic in an effort to stop Vietcong activity on the waterways. Patrols had a duration of approximately 12-14 hours.
Daylight patrols consisted of only 2 boats. At night the patrolling effort was intensified with 6 boats on patrol from each section of each division to combat the increased Viet Cong activity which took place at night.
ESCALATION
The success of the river patrols could be measured in several ways. Initially the local water users were irritated by the US presence, but as the patrols began to cut down on the activity of the local Viet Cong the local populace became increasingly positive towards the TF and it's operations. Also, as mentioned, Viet Cong infiltration was considerably disrupted and their political control challenged. To counter this the VC began to increase their own activities in order to re-establish their control and dominance in the Delta.
The US responded by adding a further 80 boats to operation Game Warden. These were PBR Mark II's, an improved version of the early boats. Displacing nearly 1 metric ton more than the PBR Mark I and with some modifications to the placement of armaments - the twin .50 Cal was relocated further forward towards the bow.
These 80 boats were deployed as sections of 10 boats with 6 new sections being added to the existing Divisions within the TF and a new Division created containing just 2 sections. Despite this increase in capacity Game Warden was coming under increasing pressure as the VC began to re-exert themselves.
When US combat troops first began to deploy to Vietnam in 1965, it is estimated that the VC had approximately 70,000 troops in the Delta - these were organized on the basis of 1 squad/hamlet, 1 platoon/village, 1 company/district and 1 battalion/province. There was no way that Game Warden was capable of combating this large deployment since it did not have the combat power to do so.
In 1965, aware of this large concentration of enemy forces, MACV started advocating the deployment of combat forces into the Delta itself and by 1966 it was more a question where and how to base such troops.
On 15th March 1966 COMUSMACV put forward a proposal for the formation of the MEKONG DELTA MOBILE AFLOAT FORCE (MDMAF) to be designated Task Force 117. It was envisaged that this would comprise a full US Army Division with 2 of it's 3 brigades based ashore at Vung Tau and My tho and the 3rd brigade based afloat on a river based and hence mobile base. Tactical mobility was to be provided by the River Assault Squadrons, each of which was capable of transporting a battalion strength combat element.
The Operational Concept of the Task Force involved basing an Army element of Brigade strength on barrack ships for a period of 6 months and rotating the brigades of the Division. In fact, although the original proposal envisaged the deployment of a full Brigade afloat, it was only possible to accommodate a reduced brigade of 2 battalions.
The Base itself was to be located in a hostile zone and to remain there for 4-6 weeks while the Infantry Battalion patrolled the region and engaged the enemy which were found, before moving to a new Area of Operations.
Tactical operations were conducted at up to 50km from the base itself, although quite often the MRB was located much closer to the AO, and such operations would last for about 5 days. It was estimated that a single battalion could systematically search an area of 40 square kilometers during a tactical op.
Movement to the location of a tactical operation was made by land, water and air and all coordinated with local forces. It was intended that maximum use be made of air and artillery supporting fires.
MOVEMENT & LANDING OF FORCES
During movement on the waterways ASPB's would cover the flanks and rear of the formation and join monitor's in providing close-in fire support. Monitor's would lay down preparatory fire on intended landing sites on the shore assisted by arty and air. Once a landing was made, ingress and egress to the AO would be sealed off by the armed boats.
Monitor
Tactical operations were of the classical 'Search & Destroy' type. Once the enemy had been located they would be fixed in place by supporting fires and assault troops while other units were deployed as a blocking force. Massive fire power was brought to bear in order to comprehensively destroy the enemy forces.
River Assault Operations
The River Assault Squadron formed the tactical element of the Mobile Riverine Force used against the enemy units in the Delta. Each MRF had control of several River RAT units such as the 2/47 infantry from the 9th inf Div. In actuality RAT unit was a water mobile battalion that could land and attack as needed in various locations.
MONITORS AND ASSAULT PATROL BOATS HEAD IN TO SHORE
Each Riverine unit was divided into two 'echelons' called A and B respectively. The 'A' Echelon was the combat element and consisted of a battalion of infantry and fire support vessels. The 'B' Echelon was the support and logistics element.
Armament = 2x .30 Cal MG’s in the waist, 1x .50 cal MG on each side and 1x 20mm cannon in tub at stern
1 x CHARLIE BOAT
LCM 6 converted to a C&C center for the Battalion
Armament = 1x 20mm cannon in tub at stern, 1x .50 Cal tub on each side and a bow turret with 1x 40mm cannon and 1x .50 Cal MG
1 x ROMEO BOAT
Medical aid vessel based on LCM 6
Has a helipad forward over the tank deck
Armament = 1x .50 Cal tub on each side and 1x 20mm tub at stern
2 x MIKE BOATS
Converted LCM 6 monitor
Armament = same as Charlie Boat but with an 81mm direct fire mortar in the waist and 1x .30 Cal mounting on either side
4 x ASPB
Assault Support Patrol Boat – faster than LCM 6 and acting as a light monitor
Armament = 2x 20mm turrets and 1x .30 cal on each side
Optional:
PBR’s (Patrol Boats River)
Fast launches
Armament = twin .50 Cal mounted in the bow, 1x M60 on a pintle amidships and a 20mm or .50 Cal in the stern
‘B’ ECHELON
This would be moored ‘down river’ and consist of the following;
1 x Romeo Boat (aid station)
4 x ASPBs for local security
1 x Tango Boat (refueller)
3 x Artillery Barges carrying a battery of 105mm Howitzers
1 x Helicopter Barge (fuel and landing pad for 3 Huey’s
7 x LCM 8 (5 for towing and resupply of the artillery battery and 2 for the helicopter barge)
INFANTRY BATTALION
Part of the ‘A’ Echelon transported in the 13 Tango Boats of that echelon and consisting of;
1 x Recon Platoon (light weapons + dog team)
3 x Rifle Company each of;
1 x HQ + weapons Platoon
3 x Rifle Platoon each of 1 x HQ, 1 x Weapons Squad and 3 x Rifle Squad
Helicopters would be used to deploy a portion of the ground force, to position artillery, and to deliver reserves for the purpose of blocking the enemy or exploiting success. Armed helicopters would be employed for escort and fire support. Large Viet Cong forces encountered in these operations were to be neutralized or destroyed by fire and land maneuver. Should no large enemy force be encountered, the Mobile Afloat Force would be redeployed to another area of operations or the area would be systematically searched and enemy resources captured or destroyed. It was estimated that a battalion could conduct an operation throughout an area of forty square kilometers in four to six days. After troops had closed in on the final objective they would be met and withdrawn by the Navy assault group boats or possibly by helicopters. The withdrawal phase
was considered critical because of the possibility of ambush and mines. Alternate routes and decoys would be used, but the basic concept for withdrawal would be the same as that of the movement to contact. Mine-clearing devices and air cover would be used. (See Diagram above)
All available means of fire support would be employed by the force, using the air and ground operations system common throughout Vietnam. Sorties would be allocated upon planned requests; emergency requests would be honored in accordance with priorities. The Direct Air Support Center at IV Corps Tactical Zone headquarters in Can Tho would be responsible for the allocation of
tactical air support with airborne forward air controllers utilized to the maximum. Artillery support would be furnished in the traditional manner, providing fire support to all echelons of the force. Gunfire support would also be supplied by assault support patrol boats and monitors. Army helicopter gunships would be requested and allocated by the division in the same manner as for other divisional brigades.
HELICOPTERS
1 x Dust off (Medevac Huey) [see note below]
1 x Huey for aerial Command & Control
HELICOPTER SUPPORT
These may be present and allocated on a mission ;
Rifle Platoon with integral lift of Huey slicks)
Generally 2 Gunship's
**dust off note**Medical care would remain a service responsibility aboard ship. The Army would provide medical service for all elements of the force when they were away from the flotilla on an operation. Two medical evacuation helicopters would be stationed at the airfield closest to the area of operations to evacuate patients from battalion aid stations located on ATC's or from the battlefield to a mobile Army surgical hospital or an APB. Further evacuation to hospitals in the Saigon or Vung Tau area would be by helicopter or fixed wing aircraft. Hospitalization would be in the Saigon, Bien Hoa, and Vung Tau areas. A mobile Army surgical hospital located at the land base near My Tho, in conjunction with the brigade to be based there, and a surgical team located on an APB, would provide surgery and medical treatment necessary to prepare
critically injured or ill patients for evacuation to hospitals. A helicopter pad, sixteen-bed dispensary, and surgical suites with equipment necessary for one surgical team would be provided on each APB.
Communications would be provided by the permanently installed Army and Navy radio equipment aboard each ship and assault craft. This equipment would provide command, tactical, and logistical communication links to higher and subordinate headquarters. Tactical communications ashore would be by man-packed radios and by airborne relay when required.
Uniflite 31' Sport Sedan
PBR MKII
The US responded by adding a further 80 boats to operation Game Warden. These were PBR Mark II's, an improved version of the early boats. Displacing nearly 1 metric ton more than the PBR Mark I and with some modifications to the placement of armaments - the twin .50 Cal was relocated further forward towards the bow.
The Operational Concept of the Task Force involved basing an Army element of Brigade strength on barrack ships for a period of 6 months and rotating the brigades of the Division. In fact, although the original proposal envisaged the deployment of a full Brigade afloat, it was only possible to accommodate a reduced brigade of 2 battalions. 
During movement on the waterways ASPB's would cover the flanks and rear of the formation and join monitor's in providing close-in fire support. Monitor's would lay down preparatory fire on intended landing sites on the shore assisted by arty and air. Once a landing was made, ingress and egress to the AO would be sealed off by the armed boats.
Monitor
The River Assault Squadron formed the tactical element of the Mobile Riverine Force used against the enemy units in the Delta. Each MRF had control of several River RAT units such as the 2/47 infantry from the 9th inf Div. In actuality RAT unit was a water mobile battalion that could land and attack as needed in various locations.
